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SUGAR CRISIS, A COMPARISON OF TWO SMALL PERIPHERAL ECONOMIES 
Harrie Clemens and Jan P. de Groot 
1. Introduction 
Specialised sugar producers such as the Dominican Republic are hit 
hard but unevenly by the sugar crisis; the impact varies with 
dependency on the 'free' world market for sugar. The Dominican 
Republic saw its quotum in the preferential US market reduced from 
447,100 metric tons in 1983 to 145,200 in 1987 and increased the 
proportion of exports to the free world market where prices are 
unprecedently low. Cuba on the other hand, by extending its trade 
agreements with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and recently also with 
China, reduced its share of free market sales from about 40 percent in 
1971-1975 to less than a quarter in 1981-1986. Still, the free market 
is important for Cuba because the country needs the convertible 
currency for imports from the non-socialist world. 
Actually the world sugar econoray is characterised by a structural 
surplus in production capacity. A diminishing demand for sugar in the 
industrial economies concurs with support policies on the supply sides 
in the US and the EC to maintain farmers* income, in developing 
countries to substitute sugar imports. As a consequence international 
sugar trade has contracted, sales under preferential arrangemènts as 
well as those on the free market decreased. Profitability in the sugar 
sector always depended on short periods of high prices in the sugar-
cycle, but the interval between peak-prices is getting longer. One can 
expect also that each following peak will be lower than the preceding 
one, because supply and demand now react faster to price fluctuations 
(Harris, 1987:132). World trade more than before consists of refined 
sugar, the export of raw sugar depends to an increasing degree on 
special supply agreements with refineries in the United States, the 
Soviet Union and the European Community. For small exporters the 
preferential arrangemènts with these bloes are crucial to their 
survival. 
The Dominican Republic has experienced another crisis. As a result 
2 
of the downfall of the Haitian dictator Duvalier early 1986, the over 
15,000 seasonal workers who year after year left Haiti for the 
Dominican Republic to harvest sugar cane stayed at home. This decision 
made clear once more the fact that contract labor had been crimped and 
highlighted the role the dictator and his repressive apparatus had 
played in this process. Meanwhile, in the Dominican Republic emergency 
measures were taken to bring in the harvest; soldiers and government 
personnel had to be employed. These events raise the question why a 
country such as the Dominican Republic had become completely dependent 
on manual labor, and more specifically on foreign labor for the harvest 
of its main export erop, whereas Cuba mechanised more than 75 percent 
of its cane harvest. Beyond the comparison of these two cases is the 
question of the pursuit of technical change in peripheral agriculture. 
The study of innovation requires identification of the actors who 
bring about technical change, analysis of the socioeconomic structure 
in which they operate, and their position within that structure. The 
actor is the one who makes decisions with respect to the innovation. 
But actors differ in their capacity to take decisions. If the actor is 
a small farmer his capacity to change production methods is often 
limited by his lack of information on or access to relevant 
innovation. If the actor is an organisation of some weight - as is the 
case of a State Sugar Board treated in this paper - the capacity to 
decide on such innovations is much greater. So within one and the same 
socioeconomic and political system the capacity of different actors to 
innovate varies according to their positions in that system. But the 
character of the socioeconomic and political system itself also 
strongly conditions the innovative activities. Actors in comparable 
positions in different systems can display differing choices determined 
by the respective systems in which they operate. 
Edquist (1985:77) analysing technical change, in particular choice 
of technique, defines the conditions for an actor to succeed and 
emphasises the structural factors mentioned above. In his analysis, the 
choice of techniques can only be explained by considering both the 
actors and structural factors, giving in each case proper weight to 
both. 
For an actor to develop or implement technical change, or - in the 
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terms of Edquist - to become a 'social carrier of technique' there are 
various conditions. This social entity must have a subjective interest 
in implementing the new technique, it must be well organised to make 
decisions regarding the technique and the proper use of it. It must 
have the power to implement the technical change, it must have 
information about the existence of the technique, have access to it, 
and have knowledge of operating and maintaining the technique. So, when 
a certain innovation is available it will only be implemented when 
there is an actor with at least a subjective interest in it and 
sufficiënt power to introducé it. In this paper structural factors are 
emphasised, showing in particular how different socioeconomic 
structures condition the choice of techniques. 
The argument will be developed for the case of sugar cane production 
in Cuba, as an example of a socialist peripheral economy, and the 
Dominican Republic, as a capitalist peripheral economy. In both 
countries sugar production is highly important for economie growth as 
it is the main contributor to foreign currency earnings. In the two 
countries the sugar sector is largely nationalised, facilitating state 
control over capital accumulation. But large differences can be 
noticed in the choice of techniques in cane production between the two 
countries. Cuban cane production and harvesting are highly mechanised; 
in the process of mechanisation, employment in this sector has 
decreased substantially but has improved qualitatively. In the 
Dominican Republic mechanisation is limited, harvesting is still done 
entirely manually; employment in the sector has continued to be high 
but at the same time low productivity has been maintained. It will be 
argued that the different choice of techniques in the two socioeconomic 
structures has strong implications for future prospects of the cane 
sector, and the economy in general. In Cuba a sequence of innovations 
has been induced which serves as a foundation for selfsustaining 
growth, while the Dominican economy remains to be dependent on the 
availability of cheap labor. 
In Cuba the state and state enterprises have acted as a 'social 
carrier of techniques' that introduced labor saving innovations in cane 
harvesting. This can be attributed to the product market; following the 
1963 US-embargo Cuba found a stable outlet for its sugar exports in the 
socialist bloc with long-term contracts and renumerative prices. It 
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can also be attributed to the ideology of the state, which favors 
modern technology and the improvement of labor conditions in cane 
harvesting. But, as will be argued, the main determinant seems to be 
the situation on the labor market: in socialist peripheral economies 
the labor market policy of the state results in tightening of the labor 
market. In Cuba this has resulted in a spurt of mechanisation of cane 
cutting as this was necessary to maintain and expand sugar production. 
On the other hand, in a capitalist peripheral economy the state 
aims at keeping an ample labor supply, especially of seasonal labor. In 
the Dominican Republic this is realised by a segmentation of the labor 
market. Low-paid Haitian cane cutters are contracted, a policy 
associated with racial discrimination and a division of the working 
class. The introduction of labor saving techniques has been postponed, 
as the actors with the eventual power to introducé them, the state and 
the state enterprises, lack sufficiënt interest in doing so. 
The Dominican Republic has reacted to the world market crisis by 
closing several of its sugar enterprises and allocating land to 
alternative export crops or import substitution. In view of the 
structural factors that dominate the crisis, the state and sugar 
companies this time were not prepared to continue the accumulation of 
losses. Moreover, the Dominican Republic's high foreign debt requires 
more foreign exchange earnings than the sugar sector can supply. 
Notwithstanding the decrease of the area under cane, the labor problem 
has not been solved, the State Sugar Board (CEA) aims to come again to 
an agreement with the new Haitian administration on contracting 
seasonal labor (El Nacional, 6-2-1988). 
While in the last two decades the Dominican Republic and in 
particular CEA simply maintained their sugar sector to extract a 
surplus, Cuba invested heavily in its sugar branch. Investments and 
innovations were made in agriculture, among others in cane harvest 
mechanisation, and in the sugar industry. The preferential Soviet-bloc 
markets provided a stable base for this development, but Cuba also 
wants to sell part of its sugar on the world market to earn a hard 
currency income. Low sugar prices for those sales were one of the 
factors which in 1986 caused a f all of nearly 50 percent in Cuba's 
convertible currency earnings, which implied severe shortages of 
imported inputs. As Zimbalist (1988:11) puts it, this greatly 
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diminished the possibilities for material incentives which make the 
economy to function properly. The access to preferential markets for 
three quarters of its sugars exports and the substantial investments 
made in the sugar sector are important considerations for the Cubans 
not to limit their sugar production. Given the gloom prospects for 
world sugar demand this policy is not without risks. Through forward 
and backward linkages the sugar sector is substantially integrated in 
the Cuban economy. This makes it difficult to cut back on sugar 
production because of the consequences in related branches, but is 
raises possibilities for selfsustained growth as new opportunities for 
accumulation are created. 
The paper starts with a short description of the two cases, the 
Dominican Republic in Section 2, and Cuba in Section 3. In Section 4 a 
comparison will be made with respect to the role of the agro-export 
sector in the economy, the choice of techniques in cane agriculture, 
the labor market strategy, the type of state, and the resulting 
accumulation model and labor relations. The conclusions are summarized 
in Section '5. 
2. The Dominican Republic: the case of a capitalist peripheral 
economy 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a modern export-oriented 
sugar sector developed in the Dominican Republic (Boin and Serulle 
1981s36). From the beginning of this century seasonal labor was 
provided by migrating laborers from the English-speaking Antilles. 
Af ter the 1916 occupation of both the Dominican Republic and Haiti by 
the United States, seasonal labor was contracted in Haiti, as is the 
case today (Carrefio 1984; 117). 
The need for large numbers of seasonal workers that characterises 
the sugar cane harvest produces extremely miserable labor conditions. 
Cane cutting is an arduous and low-paid job, done by workers who lack 
other employment opportunities. Employers have an interest in limiting 
alternative opportunities for peasants and workers by restricting 
access to land. Left without income generating opportunities in the 
off-season, workers are willing to cut sugar cane in the harvest 
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season. Employers also used to employ foreign migrating laborers, as 
expatriate workers represent a politically weak and in fact a 
vulnerable labor force. In the Dominican Republic the Haitian cane 
cutters are discriminated in the labor market. They are cheated in 
their piece rate wages and they are repressed in order to prevent their 
becoming organised. The gap between the several segments of the labor 
market has widened. Dominicans look down upon cane harvesting 'as work 
for Haitians *. 
The sugar sector contributed to the disarticulated character of the 
Dominican economy. The sugar industry formed an enclave with very few 
links to other sectors of the national economy. But apart f rota this 
sectoral disarticulation there was also a social disarticulation (De 
Janvry, 1981:34) as economie growth was not oriented toward the 
development of consumption of the Dominican peasants and workers. They 
were seen one-sidedly as a source of cheap labor, ignoring their role 
as consumers who, by increasing demand, can stimulate economie growth. 
Large concentrations of landholdings, a consequence of land 
appropriation by the sugar companies, involved the expulsion of 
peasants from their land and played an important part in the origin of 
land-tenure relations that contributed to the unequal character of the 
development process. 
After the death of the dictator Trujillo in 1961 his sugar 
possessions, which included 12 of the 16 sugar factories in the 
country, were confiscated by the state, and since 1966 these have been 
managed by a state board, the Consejo Estatal de Azücar (CEA) (Cassa 
1982:234). The state is not behaving very differently from a private 
firm that aims at short term profit maximisation without considering 
macro-economie aspects or long-term development. Because of political 
favoritism, efficiency is low. Economie surpluses - especially when 
export prices are high - are transferred to the public budget; leaving 
the sugar board over the years practically without funds to reinvest 
(De Groot 1986:12). 
Since the 1960s, the number and the proportion of landless laborers 
and especially of minifundistas has increased due to a dualistic 
development between peasant and capitalist agriculture. This has 
resulted in an increasing supply of semiproletarian labor, as small 
farmers are forced to supplement the income from their own plots with 
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wage labor. In the agrarian labor market quite a clear differentiation 
can be observed between semiproletarian peasants, landless laborers, 
women, and Haitian workers. Haitian migrant laborers present a 
distinguishable segment at the bottom of the labor market, providing 
cheap labor that puts pressure upon the labor market. 
In the Dominican Republic supply in the agrarian labor market largely 
exceeds demand. But the demand for seasonal labor in agriculture seems 
to have increased. Capitalist farmers using modern production methods 
have applied more labor per hectare in wage food crops, such as rice 
and in sugar cane, than have peasant producers. This higher labor 
intensity was limited to such seasonal operations as transplanting of 
rice and harvesting of sugar cane. In the 1980s, harvest operations and 
traditional transport by ox-cart of sugar cane required about 60,000 
seasonal workers. About 80 percent of this seasonal work is done by 
Haitians, most of whom have resided for years in the Dominican 
Republic, but over 15,000 are contracted annually by CEA in Haiti. The 
picture that emerges is one of higher seasonal labour peaks especially 
in capitalist farms and in commercial crops (Buitelaar & De Groot 
1985:83). 
The government labor market policy contributed to a continuous and 
ample supply of seasonal labor by limiting the redistribution of land, 
by restricting the small farmer's access to credit and other 
governmental programs, and by contracting foreign migrant labor, with 
the objective of keeping wages low so as to benefit the capitalist 
farmer in his pursuit of the export market. 
Over the past 25 years the techniques used in the cultivation of sugar 
cane in the Dominican Republic have changed unevenly. Soil preparation, 
planting, and cultivation have largely been mechanised, whereas 
harvesting has remained almost completely a manual operation. Soil 
preparation which in the early 1960s was carried out by oxen and plow, 
is now mainly done by machine contractors; weeding, formerly a manual 
operation, nowadays is done by the application of herbicides. But the 
traditional way of harvesting has changed very little: all cane is cut 
by hand, and only about 10 percent is loaded mechanically (GEPLACEA, 
1983:67). 
Within the Dominican Republic there has been an extended discussion 
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about the need to change techniques in sugar cane harvesting. For a 
long time it has been realised that there is a considerable political 
risk involved in depending largely upon a foreign labor force for the 
harvest of the main export erop. Attention has frequently been focused 
on the 'paradox' of importing foreign labor while at the same time 
suffering from substantial unemployment. However, the contracting 
of a foreign migrant labor force depresses wages and keeps the cost of 
cane cutting at a low level. Replacement of Haitian cane cutters by 
Dominican workers would be accompanied by an increase in labor 
productivity, which can be attained by mechanisation or by modification 
of the traditional harvest method. 
Mechanisation of cane cutting seems to be unprofitable as long as 
cheap labor is available. Moreover, the decline over the last 25 years 
of the average cane yield has made prospects for mechanisation, at 
least in part of the area, even less attractive. Mechanisation of the 
cane harvest requires adjustments in the total system of cultivation 
and requires an extended period of preparation. Up till now the state 
sugar board, CEA, which in this case can be defined as the potential 
'social carrier of technique' has shown little interest in this 
innovation. But as presently Haitian seasonal workers do not migrate in 
sufficiënt numbers the labor scarcitiy is more severe than before 1986. 
In the 1987/88 harvest CEA reported a shortage of some 7000 cane 
cutters and after some experimentation last year it has now started to 
deploy four combine harvesters in Ingenio Quisqueya (Listin Diario, 2-
3-1988). 
Modification of the traditional harvest method includes two 
elements. First, the traditional chopper must be replaced by an 
improved one that is longer and thereby demands less stooping of the 
cane cutter and enables cutting several cane stalks at a time. 
Secondly, the work must be organised in teams facilitating a division 
of labor between cutters and loaders, who take turns at the jobs. 
Experiments have been carried out successfully on a number of CEA 
plantations (Latorre et al., 1984:144). It is not easy to understand 
why such a measure to increase labor productivity has not been 
introduced on a large scale. One of the aspects CEA seems to fear most 
is that the new system tends to organise labor in working teams, that 
could provide a basis for further organisation of the workers, 
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something fiercely opposed by the sugar board (Plant, 1987:121). 
Another aspect is that a successful implementation of this innovation 
requires substantial improvement of the transport of cane from field to 
factory. The large number of ox-carts used, the shortage of train 
wagons and lack of logistics make this condition hard to fuif il. The 
introduction of the improved method would make it possible to reduce 
dependency on the foreign labor force because of its labor saving 
effect. The moment could not be more appropriate for such an 
innovation. More Dominican workers could then be employed for more 
productive jobs. If more nationals are to be employed, however, not 
only should wages be increased, but work and living conditions must 
also be improved (Moya Pons, 1986:140). The productivity increase 
resulting from a change in the traditional harvest method might be 
insufficiënt to pay for this. Thus CEA has opted not really to change 
the traditional method; it prefers to continue the contracting of large 
numbers of seasonal workers from abroad. According to the vice-
president of the Republic Morales Troncoso, who is heading CEA, the 
country needs to renew the contract with the Haitian government on the 
provision of seasonal labor. The Dominican state so far has not pressed 
CEA to introducé labor saving techniques in cane harvesting and to 
bring in more Dominican workers. It appears ultimately more interested 
in maintaining an abundant supply of cheap labor than in creating 
productive employment for Dominican peasants and workers. 
At the enterprise level the introduction of mechanisation of the 
cane harvest in the Dominican Republic is postponed as long as cheap 
foreign labor is available. But at the same time, mechanisation 
requires a prolonged preparation period in order to bring about the 
necessary adjustments. Central Romana, the largest private producer, is 
following this strategy; the company is preparing itself for 
mechanisation to be achieved in three stages: mechanisation of the 
cultivation of the erop, of cane loading and finally of the harvest. 
Fields and water courses are gradually adjusted in order to be ready 
for a f ast introduction of a complete mechanisation (Morales, 
1981:43). 
Capital can be accumulated either by appropriating resources or by 
extracting a surplus from existing production. Capital accumulation is 
the basis for survival and expansion of the capitalist enterprise. It 
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is also an important condition for economie growth, as capital is used 
for diversifying the economy and increasing labour productivity, which 
is the basis for higher wages and incomes. 
In the Dominican sugar sector, capital has been accumulated mainly 
on the basis of cheap seasonal labour. The state has shown more 
interest in extracting a surplus from a foreign labor force, than in 
promoting a process of selfsustaining growth based on productivity 
increasing innovations in the sugar sector, whether by improving the 
traditional harvest method or by mechanisation. In particular, 
mechanisation would require investments in land and labor saving 
facilities, which CEA has been unable to make because its surplus is 
systematically withdrawn by the Ministry of Finance. 
At the moment the possibilities for innovation, which would require 
considerable investments in modernisation, are limited, particularly 
because of the gloomy prospects of the world sugar market. In the last 
few years the state sugar sector has hardly provided any surplus to the 
Dominican development process. 
CEA has now made a start with the implementation of its plan to 
close six of its 12 sugar factories; since early 1987 five milis have 
been shut down and one is transformed to produce liquid sugar. In 1986 
these plantations, including their outgrowers, comprised 27 percent of 
CEA's cane area and contributed 22 percent of its sugar production. The 
State Sugar Board is allocating former cane land to alternative 
activities. It rents out land to or associates with exporters who are 
taking advantage of the duty-free entry provided to US markets under 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative by growing non-traditional vegetable and 
fruit crops. Alternative activities are likewise developed for the 
internal market: fruits, African palm, soghum and livestock. Part of 
the land was sold for tourist development and three Export Processing 
Zones are under construction on CEA grounds. Finally, part of the land 
taken out of cane production is distributed by the Dominican Agrarian 
Reform Institute; beneficiaries receive plots of about two hectares, 
insufficiënt land to eke out a living. The closing of the sugar 
factories implies a substantial loss of state owned capital; in future 
the Dominican state will at best control part of the surplus to be 
generated in the alternative activities. 
Private sugar companies, Central Romana and Vicini, also cut back their 
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production. Vicini closed down two of its three milis and Central 
Romana slightly reduced its cane area diversifying land to livestock, 
fruits and vegetable crops. In the Dominican Republic cane land is thus 
increasingly allocated to other export crops, using new sources of 
cheap, seasonal labor, in particular women, thus starting another 
cycle of disarticulated growth. 
3. Cuba: the case of a socialist peripheral economy 
Before 1959 sugar production dominated the Cuban rural labor market, 
as it dominated the Cuban economy in a general sense. In the 1950s, 50 
percent of the economically active population in agriculture worked in 
the sugar cane during the harvest season. After the crisis of the early 
1930s hardly any foreign labor was utilized, and high labor 
requirements in cane cutting were met by domestic agricultural workers. 
A very high proportion of these workers had to seek other employment 
in the off-season. Only few succeeded in finding other wage employment, 
and possibilities for subsistence production were extremely limited in 
Cuba, because of monopolisation of the land by sugar companies. 
However, the scarcity of alternative sources of income generation, 
leading to a high availability of seasonal cane cutters, but also to 
high seasonal unemployment, proved beneficial to their employers. It 
facilitated harvesting the cane at the best moment in a short time. 
Only in March, the peak month of the harvest, labor shortages existed 
in some regions but these could be filled up by migrant domestic 
workers. Sufficiënt labor supply during the harvest could only be 
realised because of high unemployment in the off-season, given the 
techniques in use, the predominance of the sugar sector on the labor 
market, and the lack of complementary employment opportunities. 
Af ter 1959, when the former government was overthrown by Fidel 
Castro's revolutionary movement, the situation on the labor market 
changed rapidly (Clemens, 1985). The implementation of new policies was 
associated with a rise in employment. In the first years af ter 1959, 
growth in non-sugar agriculture, mainly food production, in the 
construction sector, and especially in government services, 
particularly the army, created many new jobs. The exodus of workers 
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from agriculture was accompanied by a demand for them. This increase 
was caused by the land reform which included the nationalisation of 
foreign-owned plantations and increased the access to land for part of 
the agricultural labor force, and by the diversification policy, the 
latter receiving strong emphasis in the years from 1959 to 1963. The 
land reform resulted in a more permanent labor demand in the public 
sector, even if new employment was only in part productive, and in an 
increase in the number of small farmers, turning some semiproletarian 
workers into small farmers (Pollitt, 1973:255). The result of these 
developments was a growing labor shortage in agriculture, especially 
during peak activities like cane cutting, which was even aggravated by 
imbalances in the distribution of labor power within the sector. 
By 1964 a major break in the Cuban development strategy occurred 
as the industrialisation policy and diversification policy failed. 
These policies led to a serious shortage in the balance of payments, 
which came to be a principal bottleneck for further development. Cuba 
found out that, being a small country, a growth strategy has to be 
based on a functional insertion in an international division of labor. 
So an export-led growth strategy was implemented based on expansion of 
the sugar sector. Important to this strategy were the trade agreements 
with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The socialist 
countries provided a stable and growing market for the main part of the 
Cuban sugar production, with guaranteed prices, which thereby changed 
the character of sugar dependency (Pollitt, 1986). 
In the sugar sector solving the labor shortage was essential to 
increased production in accordance with the development strategy of the 
later 1960s. The govemment tried to do this in several ways. Apart 
from an anti-migration policy and mobilising urban labor power to 
perform agricultural work, these included technological change in sugar 
cane growing. The pursued technological change would reduce peak labor 
demand. One way to reach this was a lengthening of the harvest period. 
A somewhat longer harvest than in the 1950s was easily attainable 
without any change of cultlvation techniques. A further lengthening 
could be realised by the development of early ripening cane varieties. 
Government policy in the 1960s was quite successful in this respect. 
However, at the end of the 1960s the harvest was forced to be even 
longer because of the labor problems. Most important to the reduction 
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of peak labor demand was the mechanisation of cane harvesting; it will 
be clear that the state and the state enterprises had a strong interest 
in mechanisation. Labour saving innovations in cane harvesting were 
essential for a success of the export-led growth strategy. Organised 
workers did not oppose to these labor saving innovations, as they were 
pursued in a context of labor shortages instead of unemployment. In 
addition, mechanisation was seen as a way to get rid of the arduous 
tasks of cane cutting and cane loading. 
Mechanical cane loaders were successfully introduced in the 1960s. 
This was a result of a harmony of interest among the different actors 
involved, of which the state was a strong actor with enough power and 
organisational capacity to realise the innovation (Edquist, 1985:32-
52). Being a successful 'social carrier of technique' meant having 
information about the existence of a technique, having access to the 
technique, and having knowledge how to use the technique. It had been 
difficult to introducé combine harvesters in the 1960s because the 
technology was not yet well developed and because Cuba did not have 
access to U.S. technology and did not make use of Australian technology 
before 1970. The development of Cuban designed machines took some time. 
However, in the early 1970s the limitations were overcome. This was 
mainly the result of a technological breakthrough, but also of the 
decision made at the end of 1970 to import Massey Ferguson combines 
from Australia, and the decision to burn the cane before harvesting. 
After some years increasing mechanisation was facilitated by the 
introduction of KTP-1 combine harvesters, a product of cooperation 
between Cuban and Soviet engineers, and produced in Cuba. By 1987 
nearly all cane was mechanically loaded and more than 65 percent was 
cut by combines. In addition, productivity of manual cane cutters 
increased in the 1970s, which can be attributed in part to increasing 
use of so-called dry cleaning centers before delivering the cane to the 
mill. When used for manually cut cane these substitute for dethrashing 
and cutting the cane into stalks. 
The resulting mechanisation of cane cutting and increasing 
productivity by the remaining manual cane cutters have resulted in a 
large increase in average labor productivity. Because of the former 
predominance of cane cutting in total labor demand in agriculture, 
this labor productivity has had a profound socioeconomic significance. 
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First, mechanisation of harvesting has levelled off labor demand in 
sugar cane cultivation, making permanent employment economically 
feasible. Secondly, the accumulation model has changed, replacing the 
old model of extracting surplus value from cheap seasonal labor with a 
model based on labor productivity increases. 
After years of heavy emphasis on agricultural investments in the 
sugar sector, in the late 1970s and in the 1980s renewed emphasis was 
given to industrial investments. Again the sugar sector was important 
in this new stage. Investment resources were directed to both the 
sugar industry itself and to the sugar sector-related industries. Since 
1980 nine new milis were built in Cuba and some 40 existing milis were 
enlarged or modernised. While Roca (1976) concluded from his analysis 
of the 1970 sugar harvest that the failure to meet the ten million ton 
goal could be mainly attributed to problems in the industrial 
processing of the cane, Feuer (1987:75) argues that today the 
production of sugar cane is becoming a limiting factor in the further 
growth of sugar production. 
Apart from sugar milling, investments were made in industries 
related to the sugar sector. As mentioned, combine harvesters are 
produced in Cuba itself, ans so are most of the other machines used in 
cane agriculture. More than half of the equipment of the new milis was 
built in Cuba. The machine industry related to the sugar sector 
experienced high growth rates in the 1980s, doubling its production 
between 1981 and 1985. Another development took place in the area of 
sugar by-products. Bagasse is now used to produce paper and board 
products and molasses are used for animal f eed, in part through the 
production of toruia yeast, which is mixed with other molasses yielding 
a high protein animal feed. In addition, bagasse was substituted for 
oil as a source of energy in the sugar industry which by 1986 became 
totally self-sufficiënt with respect to energy (Noa, 1983; Feuer, 1987: 
72, 78). On the other hand sugar is still exported as raw sugar to be 
refined in consumer countries. 
Mechanisation of cane harvesting has eliminated Cuban dependency 
on the availability of a large reserve of seasonal labor power. But the 
machinery manufactured in the country contain a considerable import 
component, thus increasing dependency on the world market. The need to 
earn hard currency and the substantial investments made in sugar milis 
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since 1980 make it difficult to reduce sugar production now that world 
market prices have gone down, as this would imply large capital losses. 
In fact the Third Five Year Plan (1986-1990) aims in this quinquennium 
at an expansion of raw sugar production by 15 percent, and of refined 
sugar production by 23 percent. 
Dependency on raw sugar prices on the world market, however, has 
been reduced by increasing other uses of sugar cane, and more 
importantly, by Cuban trade agreements with the Soviet Union, China, 
and Eastern European countries. The share of free market sales has 
been decreasing from 38 percent in 1971-75 tot less than 25 percent in 
1981-84 (Feuer 1987:77). The Soviet Union, which imports more than 50 
percent of total Cuban raw sugar exports, is paying substantially more 
than world market prices, and since the late 1970s also more than U.S. 
preferential prices (Turits, 1987: 167). In fact export prices were 
linked to prices of key imports, including oil, which resulted rather 
beneficial for Cuba after 1974. Recently, China is becoming 
increasingly important for Cuban sugar sales, buying some 11 percent of 
total export volume since 1985. 
Notwithstanding increasing domestic capital goods production and 
favorable trade agreements with socialist countries, Cuba still depends 
on hard currency imports for several strategical goods. Thus reduced 
free market sales of sugar, though saving the sugar sector from a 
crisis such as those experienced by other countries, does affect Cuban 
import capacity of industrial goods, particularly of those not produced 
by socialist countries. Reduced hard currency import capacity was 
compensated by increasing oil re-exports in the mid-1980s. Oil re-
exports are made possible by an agreement with the Soviet Union that 
any petroleum shipment specified in the five-year contract that Cuba 
does not consume because of energy conservation, may be re-exported by 
the country (Zimbalist, 1988:8). In 1983 and 1984 oil re-exports 
represented 40 percent of hard currency income, compared to 20 percent 
earned by free market sugar exports (Turits 1987: 175). In fact 
commercial relations with the Soviet Union, together with intemal 
energy savings policy, shifted dependency on world market prices of 
sugar to dependency on oil prices. Import capacity of industrial goods 
to be paid in hard currency, even though ultimately based on sugar 
production, depends nowadays more on fluctuations of oil prices than on 
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those of sugar. Since 1986 oil prices have gone down too, making this 
substitution less beneficial than in the early 1980s. 
4. Comparison of the Dominican and Cuban sugar cane sector 
Role of the agro-export sector in the small peripheral economy 
The Dominican Republic and Cuba have in common that they are small, 
peripheral countries. Because of the limited size of their domestic 
markets most capital goods cannot be produced on an efficiënt scale, so 
these must be imported. Foreign exchange has to be generated by the 
export of primary products. Thus, in an economie sense, the primary 
export sector replaces a domestic capital goods sector (Fitzgerald, 
1985). Economie growth thus depends on a surplus in foreign exchange, 
and for the peripheral state, both capitalist and socialist, that 
means control of the foreign exchange surplus. In both the Dominican 
Republic and Cuba, the production of sugar, the main export product, is 
largely controlled by the state by means of state enterprises. 
Choice of techniques in Dominican and Cuban cane agriculture 
When considering the choice of techniques in the Dominican and Cuban 
sugar cane sector, and the resulting accumulation model great 
differences can be noticed. Cuban production and harvesting are highly 
mechanised, whereas in the Dominican Republic mechanisation is limited 
to soil preparation, planting, and cultivation; harvesting is still 
done manually. 
In Cuba, according to the ideology of socialist states, priority in 
the use of modern technology was given to the state sector which was 
considered to represent superior production relations. In particular 
the state sugar estates were expected to generate production surpluses 
necessary for future development. Increases in sugar cane yields were 
furthered as the extension of sugar production encountered its limits 
and food production simultaneously had to be increased. The main reason 
for the mechanisation of cane harvesting in Cuba was that the state and 
its enterprises, the entities that can be considered as social carriers 
of techniques, had a strong interest in introducing labor saving 
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innovations because of the labor shortage that developed in the 
economy. 
In the Dominican Republic the state sugar enterprises had ample 
access to land. The low cost of land held in reserve - and not, as in 
Cuba, incorporated in food production - implied that there was little 
emphasis on yield increases. In general, there is a tendency in 
agriculture first to introducé mechanical equipment for power-intensive 
operations such as soil preparation, whereas the mechanisation of 
control-intensive operations such as harvesting is postponed as long as 
cheap labor is or can be made available (Binswanger, 1984:17). The 
result is a pattern of technical change with a bias towards partial 
mechanisation of power intensive operations only, with an increasing 
demand for seasonal labor (Graziano da Silva, 1981:108; Roitman, 
1982:22). 
In the Dominican Republic cane cutting and loading were not 
mechanised and even a simple modification of the traditional harvest 
method proved unfeasible. Any innovation that could increase labor 
productivity was held off because the state sugar enterprises expected 
that such innovations would increase the pressure to substitute 
Dominican workers for Haitian cane cutters, and modification of the 
traditional harvest method moreover could give way to the organisation 
of labor. Both changes it was feared would eventually result in higher 
labor costs. 
Labor market strategy 
These divergent interests of the Cuban and the Dominican state and 
state enterprises in labor-saving innovations can thus be attributed 
to different situations in the labor market. Tightening .of the labor 
market played a central role in the Cuban decision to mechanise the 
cane harvest. After the revolution, the strategy aimed at changing the 
relations of production to favor peasants and workers by providing 
more access to land and, in particular, by creating more permanent 
employment on state enterprises. Labor repression was alleviated, 
resulting in a decline of labor discipline and working hours. Income 
increases were provided through the introduction of collective goods 
and services, which in turn implied a new source of employment. An 
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important result of these various policy measures was a decline in 
labor supply in the agro-export sector. However, the need for a 
surplus in foreign exchange remained, or even increased, and thus the 
demand for labor did not decline. The consequence was a tightening of 
the labor market. 
In the Dominican Republic the labor market strategy for the agro-
export sector was to keep an ample labor supply. This strategy, 
characteristic of capitalist peripheral economies in general, 
necessitates the supply of semiproletarian labor to meet the seasonal 
demand in most export crops. Such an abundant labor supply is best 
guaranteed if state policy limits the access of peasants to land, 
credit, and other means of production. Most large landowners use the 
land extensively, and strongly resist reform policies which would 
affect labor supply. In the Dominican Republic land reform has been 
rather limited, which has resulted in an increase in the 
semiproletarian labor supply. This labor supply is augmented by 
contracting foreign labor. In the case of Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic, it can be seen that different labor market strategies result 
from differences in the nature of the state. 
Type of state 
In the Dominican Republic, as in most small capitalist peripheral 
economies, the state is dominated by a dependent bourgeoisie, mainly 
consisting of producers and traders of agro-export of import-
substitution goods. Effective demand is located in foreign markets or, 
as f ar as the import-substitution industry is concerned, in the 
internal market of high income earners. This import-substitution 
industry depends upon foreign technology and ultimately upon export 
performance for the import of the means of production and raw 
materials, as well as for the size of its market. There is no deepening 
of the domestic market for wage goods as long as the dominating sectors 
have a one-sided interest in keeping wages low. The agro-export 
producers bring in the foreign exchange surplus; they control the 
access to land and means of production, while labor is kept in a 
subordinated position. The interest of the dominating classes in 
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keeping wages low means that they dissociate wage levels from labor 
productivity and that there is no interest in a long term development 
strategy aimed at structural change (De Janvry, 1984:2). 
The Cuban state is dominated by the party, as a vanguard of workers 
and peasants, that has claimed to change the subordinated position of 
these classes and to provide them with income security and basic needs. 
Basic needs provision was extended primarily through collective 
services. The party and the government bureaucracy could not base a 
development strategy on a continuation of a semiproletarian form of 
cheap seasonal labor and thus had to look for structural change. The 
need to look for structural change was compounded by the ideological 
influence in favor of modern technology. However, it was the 
tightening of the labor market that forced the mechanisation of the 
cane harvest and that resulted in the sugar sector in an accumulated 
model based on labor productivity increases. 
Accumulation 
In the past accumulation in the Dominican Republic was based on an 
extension of land and on bringing in more unskilled labor. An 
important source of accumulation was through extension of the 
cultivation of cane onto formerly unproductive land. Sugar estates 
acquired land on concessional terms from the state, while peasants who 
occupied these lands were driven to other, often marginal areas. Cheap 
labor was and continues to be another source of accumulation, 
especially seasonal migrants from Haiti, the reproduction cost of whom 
continue to be supported by peasant households in the neighbouring 
country. These sources of accumulation were supplemented by labor 
productivity increases resulting from partial mechanisation and by 
temporal rent income in years when export prices have been high. 
In Cuba after the revolution accumulation in the state sector was 
supported by appropriation of land from owners identified with the 
former regime, especially from foreign companies. However, the 
possibility of extracting surplus value from seasonal labor was 
restricted as the abundant labor supply came to an end. Cuba then had 
to look for a new accumulation model. Voluntary labor became a new 
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source of cheap labor, but only temporarily. More important were the 
increases in labor productivity through technological progress geared 
to higher yields and more fully developed mechanisation as a response 
to the tightening of the labor market. Capital accumulation based on 
increased labor productivity, through a process of technical change, 
in the 1970s led to self-sustaining growth in the sugar sector. Very 
important was the shift away from temporal rent income received before 
1963 in years with high export prices to stable terms of trade with the 
socialist bloc. 
Labor relations 
Increases in labor productivity are a condition for improving the 
Standard of living of the workers. When technical change is largely 
omitted and productivity fails to increase, as was the case in the 
Dominican sugar sector, this impedes the pretended development of 
improved job opportunities for Dominican labour. Cane harvesting then 
continues to depend on a huge army of cheap seasonal labor. The 
availability of this labor requires the denial of access to land and 
means of production to peasants and landless workers and supports the 
use of a foreign migrating labor force that is discriminated and 
repressed. In Cuba, the former model of subordinated seasonal labor 
has disappeared and fewer, but more permanent and better qualified jobs 
have been created. 
Sugar crisis 
The Dominican Republic sees its access to the preferential US sugar 
market crumble away, the prospect is one of complete dependency on the 
free world market which makes survival of the sugar-export sector 
doubtful. Hence marginal sugar enterprises are closed and land is 
allocated progressively to non-traditional export crops. The decision 
to close these factories and to write off all at once the capital 
invested was made easier by the enclave character which the sugar 
sector had kept in the Dominican Republic. As capital for alternative 
activities comes chiefly from foreign and domestic private investors, 
the state will, as indicated before, have little control over the 
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surplus generated in the new activities. The decision to close down 
part of the sugar factories was prompted by the continuing labor 
problems. The Dominican Republic has not been able to resolve the other 
crisis: sever labor scarcity in the cane harvest as a consequence of 
the staying away of Haitian seasonal migrant labor. The sugar sector 
has not prepared for large-scale mechanisation and at the depressed 
price level for sugar the capital for such investments is not 
available. Despite rethoric on 'dominicanization' of the sugar harvest 
the way out proposed by the sugar sector, and taken over by the 
government, is to return to the much criticised annual contract between 
CEA and the Haitian Ministry of Social Affairs that arranges the hiring 
of large numbers of Haitian cane cutters. Cheap labor also is the base 
of the alternative export activities. 
Cuba locates the main part of its sugar exports in preferential markets 
of the East-bloc, yet the functioning of its economy is rather 
sensitive with respect to availability of hard currency. The actual 
three-to-one proportion of sales in the preferential and the free 
market respectively allows the country to continue sales at a loss in 
this free market. The integration of the sugar sector in the Cuban 
economy was mainly brought about before the actual crisis broke out. 
The use of by-products for energy and animal f eed, the domestic 
production of equipment and machinery and several other linkages give 
solidity to the sugar branch. The mechanisation of the cane harvest 
that basically resolved the labor problem was achieved by developing 
production of machinery within the economy. It is along these lines 
that the industry is thought to survive; the planning is for a higher 
output of refined sugar and the search is for new sugar-cane-based 
products. Yet the trend for lower sugar consumption sooner or later 
will also effect the preferential markets where Cuba actually sells the 
bulk of its sugar. 
5. Conclusions 
In both the Dominican Republic and Cuba the state and state enterprises 
are the most important 'social carriers of technique' in sugar cane 
production. Their distinct interests in the two countries in labor-
saving innovations can be attributed to different situations on the 
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labor market. In Cuba this has resulted in a spurt of mechanisation to 
replace seasonal workers in cane harvesting, and in a process of self-
sustaining growth in the sugar sector. In the Dominican Republic cane 
production is dependent on cheap seasonal labor, which was realised by 
contracting Haitian cane cutters. The dependence on this foreign labor 
force was highlighted by the fall of the Haitian dictator in early 
1986, which led to problems in contracting labor. The postponement of 
the introduction of labor saving innovations and the systematic 
transfer of a surplus from the sugar sector has prevented the 
achievement of a self-sustaining growth process in the Dominican sugar 
industry. The industry not only failed to find other sources of cheap 
labor, but actually is closing down part of its sugar f actordes. The 
brighter prospects of the Cuban sugar sector are not only due to the 
access to preferential export markets, but also to the manifold 
linkages within the economy that diversify and reinforce accumulation. 
The different choice of techniques in cane harvesting in Cuba and 
in the Dominican Republic resulted from the distinct socioeconomic and 
political structure in both countries, as their respective governmental 
policies, determined by the class nature of the state, caused a labor 
shortage in Cuba, whereas ample labor supply was maintained in the 
Dominican Republic. The behavior of the actors capable of innovating 
showed to be quite different in the two countries due to structural 
factors. These factors result in the introduction of labor-saving 
techniques in the socialist peripheral economy, whereas the labor-
intensive way of production is maintained in the capitalist peripheral 
economy. 
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